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Book Reviews
Defense Studies
Defense Management Reform: How to Make
the Pentagon Work Better and Cost Less
By Peter Levine
Reviewed by Robert D. Bradford III, assistant professor of defense and Joint
processes, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army
War College

W

ith over three million people on the payroll and spending of
almost $700 billion each year, the US Department of Defense
(DoD) is a huge bureaucracy. The Department’s massive scale and vast
and impenetrable processes make it a challenging organization to lead. As
a public sector organization consuming taxpayer resources and spending
more than half of the US discretionary budget each year, the Department
of Defense necessarily comes under constant scrutiny. Examiners of such
a large and diverse organization inevitably find evidence of wastefulness,
and the DoD’s inefficiencies draw public attention. New secretaries of
defense, service secretaries, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
service chiefs consistently include reform among their top priorities. New
leaders want to reduce inefficiencies, reassure the public, and reallocate
dollars, personnel, and equipment toward their strategic priorities. These
leaders would do well to consider the work of Peter Levine.
In Defense Management Reform: How to Make the Pentagon Work Better and
Cost Less, Levine provides a well-researched analysis of 40 years of DoD
reform efforts. He describes successes and failures through primary
source documents and personal interviews with key participants from
the executive and legislative branches and senior members from both
major US political parties. His case studies demonstrate the three
important factors that impact the success or failure of defense reforms.
Leaders must clearly frame the problem they need to solve, they need to
gain approval from key stakeholders, and they must provide consistent
and long-term attention to the implementation of their reforms.
Levine brings a wealth of experience and knowledge gained inside
the defense enterprise. He served 28 years as a professional staff member
to Senator Levin and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and
the Senate Armed Services Committee. There he reviewed and helped
craft legislation for many defense reform initiatives. After leaving the
congressional staff, Levine served one year as the DoD deputy chief
Management Officer and one year as Acting Undersecretary of Defense
for personnel and readiness in the Obama administration. More than a
spectator, Levine has been a key player in many of the defense reform
efforts he examines.
The book’s three sections are organized around changes to civilian
personnel management, defense acquisition reform, and ongoing actions
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to make the Pentagon budget auditable. Levine provides examples to show
the value of clear problem definition. He lauds the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 as a case where a
solution was developed to a clearly defined problem in Joint planning and
mission execution. On the other hand, he shows how Senator McCain’s
2014 acquisition reform efforts lacked a similar focus and addressed a
large collection of problems within the Department of Defense. These
examples also clearly demonstrate the impact of stakeholder buy-in.
Levine also highlights the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
2009 as a case where key stakeholders agreed on the problem and the
solution and the National Security Personnel System reforms of the early
2000s as a case that failed because it did not accommodate Congress or
labor unions.
The case studies also point to the final factor, consistent
implementation. In successful reform efforts like Secretary Perry’s
attempt to increase the use of commercial specifications in acquisition,
DoD leadership remained focused on the issue through to successful
completion. The quest for a clean Pentagon audit is an example where
department leaders frequently lost attention and reforms floundered.
By describing these specific reform efforts in detail and tracking
them through success and failure, Levine posits four reasons why reform
within the defense enterprise is difficult. First, he notes the Department
of Defense cannot go to a single budget line titled “WASTE.”
Inefficiencies are spread across the department in multiple budget lines
and based on a multitude of processes. Quick fixes are illusory and do
not deliver on their promises.
Second, most good ideas have already been tried. A wise leader will
survey past actions and be cognizant of people who oversell quick and
easy solutions. Third, any DoD reform will face resistance. As in any
large organization, new actions will have both supporters and detractors.
The department has multiple power centers, and the status quo holds
strong. Unless addressed directly, resistors can stop most department
change efforts.
Finally, overcoming inefficiencies requires an investment in time
and resources. Leader focus is finite, and consistent focus is often hard
to maintain. Additionally, to save money, the department must allocate
resources upfront. Being more efficient will save funds in the longer
term, but will almost always require more resources in the near term
when the competition for resources is most brutal.
To address these challenges, Levine provides three guidelines related
to successful reforms. First, department leaders require tailored solutions
to the right problems. The department should prioritize reform efforts
against the most important issues that will yield the highest rewards and
then the department must develop specific solutions to address each
of these problems.
Second, the initiative must be enacted or approved. Major initiatives
are more successful when they are based on a shared understanding

Book Reviews: Defense Studies 149
between the executive and legislative branches of government and have
support from both major US political parties.
Finally, a consistent focus on resources is required through to full
implementation. Successful execution depends on strong leadership and
consistent engagement with all stakeholders through completion. While
these three dictums seem simple, Levine’s book is full of examples where
they were not followed, and he provides plenty of evidence showing the
simplest ideas can be challenging to implement.
Defense reform will continue to be a priority for new Pentagon
leaders who arrive with a mandate to make the department work better.
Defense Management contains powerful examples of success and failure,
and its three tenets are valuable signposts for reform practitioners.

Conspiring with the Enemy: The Ethic
of Cooperation in Warfare
By Yvonne Chiu
Reviewed by C. Anthony Pfaff, research professor for strategy, the military
profession and ethics, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

W

riting in the 1930s, German philosopher Carl Schmitt famously
opined that war’s real aim is the existential negation of that enemy,
a relationship which represents the “utmost degree of intensity” of
separation (Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 26). It is easy to understand
why Schmitt would see war that way given the experience of the First
World War. The experience of the Second World War, of course, simply
reinforced the view that war is a zero sum game and anything that
benefits an enemy hurts a friend. In such a view, it is difficult to see
how cooperation is possible, much less useful. Yvonne Chiu challenges
this canon in the provocative, and sometimes surreal, Conspiring with the
Enemy. She argues cooperation among enemies in war is often the norm
rather than the exception and that cooperation, as currently manifested
in the international system, often works at cross purposes to limit the
destructive effects of war.
Chiu breaks down cooperation in war to three broad norms:
“cooperation for a fair fight, cooperation to minimize damage to a
particular class of people, and cooperation to end war quickly” (36, 90,
135). Examples illustrate the range from the obvious, to the interesting,
to the genuinely insightful, and include observation of the international
law of armed conflict, which bans certain weapons, requires wearing
of uniforms, and prohibits the direct targeting of noncombatants,
among other things. More interesting examples include timed artillery
bombardments in the First World War, which allowed both sides to
anticipate attacks and minimize casualties, and British and German
units delivering newspapers to each other. A more insightful example
is the arrangement between the Indian and Pakistani air forces during
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, where both sides agreed for a time not
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to attack the other’s ground forces, who were mobilizing in flat, open
territory. As one Pakistani officer put it, killing soldiers out in the open
seemed “none too sporting” (50).
It is easy to see how Chiu’s discussion can get surreal. The last thing
most soldiers will tell you they want is a fair fight, or perhaps more
accurately, in choosing between a fair fight and one they are more likely
to survive, soldiers will generally choose the latter over the former. This
choice is as much a matter of policy as it is of individual preference.
In 2016 General Joseph Dunford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, explicitly rejected the value of a fair fight in testimony to the
Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (Garamone, “US Troops
Should Not,” DOD News, April 27, 2016). Thus it can sometimes be
difficult to reconcile Chiu’s putative motivation for cooperation with
the actual experience of not only participating in war, but in preparing
for it as well.
It is equally clear, however, that Chiu makes a good point. While
soldiers certainly want to surprise, overwhelm, or otherwise kill their
enemy without getting killed themselves, Chiu argues persuasively that
they also want to differentiate the killing they do from murder. So for
this reason they sometimes refrain from killing the individual enemy
who gets caught defenseless while not thinking twice about killing
others by the thousands.
At the policy level, soldiers also cooperate to avoid harm to
noncombatants. This cooperation requires taking risks and foregoing
advantages that absent that intention—and reciprocity—would not
make sense. Thus, soldiers wear uniforms to differentiate themselves
from civilians, which also makes them easier to target. They do not use
certain weapons, like chemical munitions, even if using these weapons
would be decisive in a particular battle, in part because of the potential
harms to civilians and also in part because they would prefer such
weapons not be used against them.
Chiu also notes that observing norms of cooperation in war does
not necessarily make war more humane. Remotely operated precision
weapons, for example, undermine the idea of a fair fight since remote
operators are not taking risks and ensuring the protection of civilians
because the use of these weapons creates unreasonable expectations
regarding the number of civilian casualties. Since the aim of war is
the rapid defeat of the enemy, norms that require restraint can impede
military operations and lengthen a war, which simply increases over time
the number of persons killed and buildings destroyed.
Chiu’s remedy is to invigorate cooperation for ending war quickly.
This norm, which she argues has been a feature of war since Greek
hoplites fought pitched battles to settle limited disputes, has been largely
ignored in more modern wars. She attributes this fact largely to the
mobilization of mass armies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to fight wars over ideologies. When wars were between monarchs who
were more or less moral equals, it not only made sense to fight over
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limited objectives it also did not make sense to those fighting to take
a great deal of risk. Here ends and means aligned: armies simply were
not going to be capable, as a general rule, to realize someone’s excessive
ambitions. That changed, in the West at least, when French armies under
Napoleon fought for liberte, egalite, fraternite instead.
Chiu believes that international law has largely ceded questions
of jus ad bellum to the relevant actors’ ethical sensibilities and political
demands. As a result, there is more space for aggressive wars and little
space for cooperation to end them quickly. This seems an odd point to
make. She is right that international law only permits defensive wars
and certain kinds of humanitarian interventions; however, she does not
take up the argument that the same system tried to create nonviolent
alternatives to settling disputes that might otherwise lead to aggressive
wars. So one could argue that rather than ceding questions of jus ad bellum,
international law instead has answered it in the negative. By rejecting
aggressive wars and providing alternatives to fighting, international law
seeks to eliminate war as a practice.
Again Chiu has a point. Eliminating war, while a noble objective,
is elusive if not impossible. There is a gap between what the law says
and the ability of the international community to enforce it. Strong
countries still resort to war to realize their interests when they see fit,
even when doing so does not conform neatly to the letter or the spirit
of the law. Chiu also argues that by limiting just wars to only defensive
ones, international law reinforces the status quo and limits the means to
address injustices associated with it, whether that be domestic oppression
of a minority or boundaries drawn as a result of previous invasion.
This is an interesting concept and raises a number of questions
regarding to whom war rights should be given. Over what, besides
territory and sovereignty, should wars be fought, and at what point
should a party to a conflict concede defeat. To the last point the current
answer is “never,” if one’s cause is just and “immediately,” if one’s cause
is not. A quick survey of the current geopolitical landscape provides
ample evidence that this norm is inadequate. Whether the right answer
is to make room for more fighting, albeit limited, is the right direction
is an important question Conspiring with the Enemy encourages readers to
take up—especially in today’s globally competitive environment where
technology has enabled a range of actors to threaten the vital interests
of others in ways that risk escalating into war. It is a question worth
addressing before it is settled by those who prefer war.
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Regional Studies
Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy
By Kishore Mahbubani
Reviewed by Colonel Gerald Krieger, Near East South Asia Center faculty,
National Defense University

K

ishore Mahbubani’s Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American
Primacy addresses the geopolitical contest between the United States
and China, highlighting key strategic mistakes while offering lessons and
insights he hopes will better inform future policies in both countries.
Mahbubani is a prolific writer on eastern and western geopolitics, global
governance, and policy and is a distinguished fellow at the Asia Research
Institute at the National University of Singapore.
This book is based on his personal experiences as a senior diplomat
working with leaders in Beijing and Washington, DC. With a foot in both
the occidental and oriental cultures, Mahbubani—an insightful critic of
the west—is well positioned to review key policies and help America
reflect on itself to find a better approach to face China’s emergence as
a world leader. Mahbubani’s vast political experience in Asia serves as
a lens, deepening an understanding of the motivations and reasoning
behind the veil of Chinese politics. His sagacious insights must be kept
in perspective. He does treat China gingerly, which is uncommon in the
American press and academia. A more critical lens would have balanced
his thorough analysis.
There are nine chapters in the book, with an overview of the current
state of affairs between China and America and key strategic mistakes
of each country in the chapters that follow. The fourth chapter, “Is
China Expansionist?,” is crucial to dispelling media manipulations and
misunderstandings of Chinese policy and informs readers of the oriental
perspective (79). Other chapters uncover America’s bias of democracy,
along with mistaken underlying American assumptions about the global
order. Mahbubani adopts an advisory tone in the book, even going so
far as to write a fictional letter advising Xi Jinping on the best way to
deal with America. The letter is insightful capturing Chinese leader’s
views of America in the contest for global influence—Mahbubani’s
interactions with key leaders of the Communist Party of China (CCP)
shapes his depiction. The letter also acknowledges areas where China
will struggle to exert global influence, such as American dominance in
universities, and creativity promoted through a focus on the individual
which is foreign in Chinese culture.
The great power competition between China and America does
suggest a comparison to the Cold War between America and the former
Soviet Union, though Mahbubani persuasively argues that much thought
and planning went into the latter and is remarkably absent from the
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former. The biggest challenge to the west is due to closed mindedness;
“to most Americans, the idea that a free and open society like America,
the world’s strongest democracy, could lose a contest against a closed
communist society like China is inconceivable,” Mahbubani opines (9).
Contrary to what many Americans think, there is not a deep
ideological divide between the United States and the CCP over
communism and democracy, Mahbubani convincingly argues. Years
ago, China made a conscious decision to not promote communism
internationally—unlike the Soviet Union. China is different because,
much like America, its goal is to promote Chinese expansionism and
influence through the global economy. His book is meant to provide
support for a major US course correction for America centered around
improving the lives of its citizens, while returning to a strategy focused
on garnering international support with its most potent weapon, the US
dollar rather than the military.
Mahbubani’s perspective provides a sharp contrast to China’s
critics such as Stein Ringen who highlights China’s two million Internet
opinion analysts who troll the Web to remove undesirable content while
shaping the stories into the CCP’s framework. Ringen labels China as
a kleptocracy, and his sharp criticisms serve to balance Mahbubani’s
flowery perceptions of the CCP. Contrary to Mahbubani’s suggestion,
the great power competition between China and the United States will
dominate the headlines for the foreseeable future. We all need to hope
that both countries remain cognizant of the other 191 countries on
the planet.
Perhaps Mahbubani is correct, and America views China’s rapid
success on an unconscious level, to present, what he labels a great
“yellow peril” that threatens western supremacy and democracy(7, 258).
That another system of government might be a viable alternative to
democracy and more economically efficient—despite the drawbacks of
individual freedom—could be disturbing. The tug ultimately might be
between occidental reason and a subconscious aversion to the oriental
culture which ultimately might replace western global domination.
As mentioned earlier, Mahbubani’s participation in Singapore’s elite
political system more closely mirrors China’s and shapes his perceptions,
though Singapore maintains strong ties to the west. Mahbubani’s
work will provide greater insight for military practitioners and should
be required reading for senior leaders. His criticisms of American
policy are thought provoking, while his lucid observations of Chinese
motivations and perspective serve to illustrate why analysts continually
misunderstand Chinese intentions. Mahbubani reminds us that for too
long, the United States focused on the “M” or military element of soft
power in DIME—Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economy—
to influence national policy objectives. It is time to modify our approach
to meet the new emerging global threat, which will not be a military
threat but an economic and diplomatic influence around the world. The
military needs to be America’s tool of last resort, not the first. America
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needs to make decisions to encourage global cooperation, while also
being mindful of the objectives of other countries and how their
objectives might not mirror our own.
It is time for America to break the fetters of the Cold War and the
associated commitment to build and maintain the military infrastructure
which has long since taken a back seat to economic and technological
growth and innovation. China’s leaders certainly understand and will
gladly stand by as America enters costly wars, diverting crucial resources
from economic development to the military machine. Has China Won?
provides a wake-up call. Let us hope the leaders in Washington can
be open minded enough to at least consider another perspective, a
redefinition of America’s role in a multipolar world.

Irregular Warfare
Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters in the Armies of Jihad
By Daniel Byman
Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, adjunct research professor, Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, and professor of comparative politics
and international relations, Georgia Southern University

W

e live in a globalized and interconnected world. The high-tech
explosion of the twenty-first century has made communications
between friends and foe easier—but also harder to detect—and has
allowed foreign fighters to create networks, travel with ease, and expand
their technological reach. Daniel Byman’s Road Warriors: Foreign Fighters
in the Armies of Jihad provides readers with an analytical history of the
contemporary foreign fighter phenomenon in light of the democratization
of technology.
Byman, a professor at Georgetown University’s School of
Foreign Service, a senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy
at the Brookings Institution, and a former staff member of the 9/11
Commission, argues that the potential threat posed by foreign jihadists
is large and growing. In addition to conducting international terrorist
attacks, they radicalize indigenous fighters in civil wars and regionalize
conflicts (8). He defines a foreign fighter as an “individual who travels
to a state other than their own to join an illicit group and perpetrate
or assist in terrorist attacks or armed conflict” (7). He also derives
three sets of observations regarding the foreign fighter based on the
following questions: “(1) Why do individuals leave their homes to go
fight in faraway lands? (2) What impact do foreign fighters have that
makes them of such concern? and (3) How can we [the US Army and
other Western nations] better fight foreign fighters” (9). These are not
rhetorical questions. They guide Byman’s analysis of the foreign fighters
in the jihad armies.
As Byman points out, foreign fighters leave their homes to join
the mujahideen to expel occupiers of Muslim lands or groups fighting
against the so-called apostate governments or for the establishment
of a Caliphate, even if temporarily. They also make a tremendous
impact on conflicts worldwide in terms of duration and brutality. Some
foreign fighters possess considerable combat and/or technical skills
that enhance the conflict’s lethality. Others act as logisticians, travel
facilitators, passport forgers, and recruiters and contribute to the armies
of jihad because they understand the culture where a conflict occurs
and know how to appeal to the community, either with inducements of
a better future or hostility toward citizens for noncooperation, and are
often “better trained, more highly motivated and networked, and tied to
skilled planners back in the war zone” (12).
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An important contribution by Byman is his strategy on how to
combat foreign fighters and his six-stage foreign fighter production
process (13, 252). In stage one, “Radicalize,” a foreign fighter “learns
radical ideas” and “becomes angry” (253). As Byman illustrates, no
single factor explains why someone radicalizes and becomes a foreign
fighter; therefore, the goal of governments during this stage is to identify
and dissuade individuals before they take illegal actions. A government
must cooperate and coordinate its counternarrative with local religious
leaders, community businesses, and neighborhood groups that “promote
their own messages of moderation” (254).
In stage two, “Decision,” a foreign fighter becomes motivated
to fight and the individual undergoes change such as growing a
beard in solidarity to the other mujahideen (253). “As terrorism
expert Clinton Watts points out, ‘The call for jihad may be global,
but recruitment is extremely local’ ”; therefore, developing peaceful
alternatives while also integrating the mujahideen back into the
community is the objective (256, emphasis in original).
In stage three “Traveling,” a foreign fighter “travels to foreign
countries to participate in jihad” (253). Byman believes this is an
important stage since there must be cooperation with a foreign country
in order to obtain passports, money, and travel access. Foreign fighters
will usually bribe border control agents to facilitate their comings and
goings through a region or country. Border control agents, usually
underpaid, see the bribe as an important supplement to their incomes.
For example, Venezuelans have been able to travel to Iran without
having to stamp their passports. Another example, illustrated by Byman,
is the Mauritanian government. According to Byman, “the Mauritanian
government paid Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ten to twenty million
Euros a year and promised that it would not interfere with jihadist travel
if, in exchange, the group agreed not to kidnap tourists or otherwise
attack in Mauritania” (257).
Stage four “Training and Fighting in the War Zone,” is, perhaps,
the most important stage (253). Here the foreign fighter “gains skills
and experience, connects to global jihadi networks, and adopts more
extreme views” (253).
In stage five “Return,” the foreign fighter returns home by means that
“avoid law enforcement and security services” (253). Byman contends
“the return stage entails the greatest number of competing agendas,
requiring a state to adopt an array of policy options” (265). While some
governments have taken a mano dura (firm hand) approach when dealing
with foreign fighters who return home, the overall evidence indicates it
does not prevent or dissuade an individual from continuing nefarious
activities. Byman discusses the examples of France and Denmark
and their approach to returnees. France systematically prosecutes its
returnees on terrorism charges while Denmark has carefully reevaluated
its approach to reintegrate the individual into society upon his return
rather than criminalize him. As the Danish pointed out, “being more
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coercive might strengthen ‘the victim’s discourse’ within the Muslim
community and thereby exacerbate the social conditions that can lead
some individuals to participate in jihad” (265). In stage six “Plot,” the
foreign fighter plans a terrorist act and recruits potential ideological
sympathizers to join the mujahideen movement (253).
In conclusion, Road Warriors provides a history and assessment of
the modern jihadist foreign fighter movement. Furthermore, Byman’s
foreign fighter’s life cycle, provides practitioners and scholars of terrorism
with an approach for dealing with a topic unlikely to go away any time
soon. Terrorism, a pandemic of the twenty-first century, can only be
mitigated, never completely eradicated. While terrorist organizations are
often fragmented and highly divided along ideology, religious beliefs, and
leadership personalities, Byman’s long-term hope is that “transnational
jihadism, like international anarchism and communism before it, will
burn itself out or at least move from center stage to a sideshow” (267).
However, terrorism and jihadists are not simple issues policymakers
and law enforcement agencies can easily handle. As Byman suggests
“because of this resilience, the foreign fighter problem will endure even
with the Caliphate being forced underground at the end of 2018” (250).
Byman further explains that “[f]or now, governments must assume
the movement will endure, try to counter it, and limit the damage that
can be done by foreign fighters and the terrorists they inspire” (268). I
recommend Road Warriors to anyone interested in international studies,
terrorism, and international relations. But, most importantly to future
Army leaders in a “world in disarray.”

ISIS Propaganda: A Full-Spectrum Extremist Message
Edited by Stephane J. Baele, Katharine A. Boyd, and Travis G. Coan
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, instructor at the Safe Communities Institute
at the University of Southern California

T

he edited volume ISIS Propaganda, pertaining to the Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham (or Syria), is the second work in the Causes
and Consequences of Terrorism Series, a partnership between Oxford
University Press and the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland.
Its editors, all at the University of Exeter, are Stephane J. Baele, senior
lecturer in international relations and security; Katharine A. Boyd,
senior lecturer in criminology; and Travis G. Coan, senior lecturer in
quantitative politics. Inclusive of the editors, 16 contributors also
participated in the volume, including well-known terrorism specialists
Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
(FFI); Haroro J. Ingram, George Washington University; and Charlie
Winter, King’s College London.
ISIS Propaganda provides the “first comprehensive overview and
detailed analysis of this (ISIS) propaganda effort, which, we argue
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here and throughout the book, constitutes an outstanding instance of
‘full-spectrum propaganda’” (2). This is quite a feat given no prior book
has attempted to arrange the mosaic pieces related to ISIS propaganda
activities in order to create a more encompassing picture that can be
better understood and analyzed in its totality.
ISIS Propaganda is composed of front and back sections, an
introduction, eight chapters, and an afterword. The front sections
consist of the contributor listing and a glossary of frequent Arabic
terms—including terms in English, their original Arabic spelling, and
the ISIS translation in English—and individual and group names in
English and their original Arabic spelling. The introduction provides
an overview to the work and explains how ISIS is utilizing a fullspectrum propaganda approach within the context of the “IS moment
of prodigious plagiarism” (8). The impact of the use of propaganda by
ISIS and the “thorny question of the propagandists’ and propagandees’
respective agencies,” however, is not addressed (11).
The first chapter provides two key tables. The first table—related to
the “Islamic State’s ‘Hedging’ Approach”—identifies themes prioritized
during bust and boom cycles (32). The second table, “Multiple Formats
Mobilized in Islamic State Propaganda,” highlights the messaging
mediums analyzed in the follow-on chapters (36). This important chapter
recognizes “IS seeks to synchronize the actions of its ‘competitive system
of control’ with the messages at the heart of its ‘competitive system of
meaning’ ” (44).
The second chapter is organized into three parts focused on ISIS’s
ideological genealogy, the context in which its message developed, and
speculation concerning its futures messaging (51). The next four chapters
provide the messaging case studies related to the mediums utilized
for Salafi-Jihadi—that is Wahhabi derived—propaganda purposes,
principally in Arabic and English but other languages are also touched
upon. The third chapter addresses magazines, highlights the importance
of the Arabic language magazine al-Naba and the better-known Dabiq
and Rumiyah, English language magazines, and utilizes network linking
and in- and out-group and quantitative analysis.
The fourth chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the propaganda
videos utilized by the Caliphate, focusing on “province” (Wilāyāt)
produced content and trends, “script” content analysis related to ISIS
narratives, and the “Selected 10” featured video placement found in
magazines such as Dabiq. Chapter five reviews Islamic State online
propaganda use with an emphasis on its active engagement with the target
audience as opposed to more passive interactions. The successful use of
social media such as Twitter and Telegram is then explored. The sixth
chapter concerns the lesser propaganda media utilized by ISIS in terms
of their “religious chants . . . photo galleries/reports, infographics, books,
and news communiqués,” with the a cappella Islamic chants (anashīd)—
perhaps the most fascinating element (189). The seventh chapter focuses
on counter-ISIS propaganda activities including shutting down their safe
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online spaces, limiting legitimate media amplification and exploitation
for intelligence-gathering purposes, and counter-narrative strategies.
The final chapter discusses terrorist propaganda futures through its
answering of specific questions to guide the analysis related to imitative
and creative behavior on the part of ISIS and its successors (243). Each
chapter contains a reference listing at its conclusion.
The afterword by Hegghammer credits the book for helping the field
overcome a five-year struggle to better understand the “scale and nature
of the IS full-spectrum propaganda machine” by fusing the talents of
“propaganda specialists and ‘in-the-weeds’ jihadism observers” (266).
This afterword is followed by an anashīd appendix, excerpts from a
provincial news report from Al-Bayan Radio appendix, and an index.
The book has one slight demerit. Some of the chapter content
appears to have been completed in 2018 with later sporadic contributions
refreshing it into 2020, giving the information a lessons-learned rather
than a cutting-edge feel given how quickly the ISIS jihadi propaganda
spaces evolve. This problem, unfortunately, is part and parcel of
academic book publishing with its industrial-era production cycles and
is not a critique of the book itself.
Ultimately, any critique would be quibbling. ISIS Propaganda is an
extremely high-quality book with good use of tabling, figures, and
imagery. It is very informative and does an excellent integrative analysis
of seemingly disparate forms of ISIS propaganda material. It will be of
specific interest to military officers and governmental personnel tasked
with the US global response to ISIS social media use for propaganda,
radicalization, and recruitment purposes. Much of this concern today
ties into the current emergence of ISIS cells in new parts of the globe
and the foreign fighters phenomenon—with its battlefield shifting
potentials—that still has not been fully resolved.
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Strategic Leadership
From Quills to Tweets: How America
Communicates about War and Revolution
Edited by Andrea J. Dew, Marc A. Genest, and S. C. M. Paine
Reviewed by Ross Harrison, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in
Washington, DC

C

arl von Clausewitz, the famous nineteenth-century Prussian
war strategist, said, “War is the continuation of politics by other
means” (Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 87). Part of the politics of war for
Clausewitz is the interaction between the government, the people, and
the military. From Quills to Tweets embodies this insight to its fullest.
For the authors of this new and fresh contribution to the study of
war, the successful prosecution of military campaigns often depends
on adept communication strategies. Even successful military campaigns
not accompanied by an adeptly waged “war of words” risk political
objectives not being met, resulting in the most profound kind of
strategic failure (44).
Dew, Genest, and Paine fuse an elegant, simple-to-follow conceptual
framework with a sweeping historical treatment of war that yields a
rich understanding of how war and revolution are inherently political
enterprises. Readers come away with the insight that communication
can be as important a part of military strategy as the fighting itself,
even though the authors do not explicitly say this. Without effective
communication strategies, political and military leaders risk rendering
even successful military campaigns unsuccessful in meeting their
political objectives.
The book uses the insight about the inextricable connection between
warfare and communication, not as an endpoint but rather as a jumpingoff point. The authors drill down deeper than previous treatments of the
same subject, providing readers with a wonderfully innovative analysis
of how the United States has, at times, framed the political dimensions
of war to its advantage, and how at other times, political leaders have
used messaging to provide a soft political landing for military failures
like Vietnam.
The book grabs readers from the first page with the crisp treatment
of the Revolutionary War against the British and the importance of
messaging as a determinant of its success. Almost every major US
military campaign is examined—from the War of 1812, the SpanishAmerican War, the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the more
recent military campaigns in the Middle East.
The authors are as adroit in getting their message across as they
are in providing readers with an understanding of the importance of
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messaging in war. Readers will see that while time and technology have
changed the communication side of war, the fundamentals have remained
largely unchanged since the American Revolution. For sure, military
campaigns have become more geographically expansive and complex,
and the technology of messaging has become more sophisticated. But
like in earlier times, the ability for government leaders to translate
military success into the political wins discussed by Clausewitz depends
heavily on adept management of the message.
This book gets good stylistic grades as well. For an edited volume, it is
remarkably cohesive. All contributing authors used the tight framework
of the messages of war, the messengers who propagate those messages,
and the media by which the messages are propagated. Readers will forget
this book is a compilation of contributions by many authors—unlike
many edited volumes.
From Quills to Tweets is an incredibly timely contribution at a time
when US foreign policy seems to lack clearly stated objectives and
strategies, and when effective communication to the American public,
to allies, and to adversaries remains elusive and flatfooted. This tightly
written volume will provide a wakeup call for a more coherent strategy
that communicates both military and political objectives to the American
public and the world. It will be a conversation starter for renewed
discourse on how war is, in fact, a quest to achieve clear political and
strategic objectives by other means.

Organisational Learning and the Modern Army: A
New Model for Lessons-Learned Processes
By Tom Dyson
Reviewed by Seth A. Johnston, fellow at the Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs at Harvard University, and lieutenant colonel in the
US Army
New York: Routledge, 2020
262 pages
$155.00

T

om Dyson’s Organisational Learning and the Modern Army evokes the
old admonition not to judge a book by its cover. This slim hardback
makes good on its title proposition for army lessons learned. It also
surveys British and German experiences in Afghanistan, synthesizes
literature on military change, contemplates NATO, accounts for the
United States among many other factors, and offers policy advice for
related topics, including officer education and civil-military relations. Its
density is less like a sabot round than canister: though covering a large
area, each fléchette of insight still stings.
The book concentrates on how armies institutionalize learning.
Dyson views lessons learned processes as an important “transmission
belt” for moving hard-won lessons from the field into enduring changes
in training, doctrine, and other aspects of the institutional army (1).
Contrasted with other authors on the subject, Dyson is especially
bullish on the value of formal lessons learned institutions—which he
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abbreviates “LL” (3). His model identifies organizational activities—
especially operational design, basic and predeployment training, and
education—that support such formal lessons learned. On the question
of sources for military learning, Dyson considers the full range of
options but concludes factors external to the military are decisive and
that civilian leadership is especially important (246).
The book features an introductory cluster of theory chapters, two
case studies from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in Afghanistan, and closing reflections on military learning mainly
aimed at practitioners and “Practice Turn” scholars (10). In his review
of theoretical literature, Dyson pulls few punches in criticizing the
“limited analysis” of Richard Downie, John Nagl, and other authors on
organizational learning (5). To be sure, other authors, including Sergio
Catignani and Theo Farrell, enjoy multiple complimentary citations,
though perhaps as much for their shared empirical focus on the British
army in Afghanistan. Dyson embraces theoretical eclecticism and draws
explicitly from organization theory, process models like bureaucratic
politics, and strategic and other cultural approaches, all before embracing
neoclassical realism—itself a broad tent. The result is a detailed chart of
theoretical propositions on military learning, focused on the tactical and
operational levels of war.
Although the book is titled and organized as a theory-proposing
work supported by two case studies, it could be equally well read the other
way around. An examination of the two biggest European participants
in the ISAF mission—and among the most important armies in NATO
generally—is empirically valuable. Military and civilian practitioners will
find the summary takeaways from the British and German experiences
illuminating applied reading and a superb complement to the Parameters’
special issues on Afghanistan lessons learned published during the
last year (158–63, 232–42).
Dyson assesses that while British and German armies began their
Afghanistan campaigns with decent learning potential, both failed to
realize enduring lessons. The detailed reasons why reveal unexpected
gems, such as a fascinating historical and generational account of the
“three visions of military professionalism” in the Bundeswehr (221–23).
Beyond the main tactical and operational focus, Dyson reflects on
“unrealistic” British and German political expectations of their armies,
with some good sense of civil and military recommendations to close the
gap (248–49). With so much else written on the American experience, this
book offers a rare perspective. It is not merely a documentation of past
campaigns, but a work of forward-looking clarity. Dyson convincingly
argues the relevance of these cases for an army’s modernization and
readiness for newer challenges such as hybrid warfare (31, 88, 158, 247).
Organisational Learning and the Modern Army is serious reading, and a
more ruthless editor might have demanded cuts. Not all theories do equal
work in the analysis, for example, and there are some hints that still other
conceptual approaches were indeed cut from earlier drafts—mainly
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historical institutionalism and associated terms like “path-dependence”
that remain sprinkled through individual sections (58). Empirically,
the book offers useful information about the multinational NATO
lessons learned institutions, but these are not central to the British or
German cases.
Stylistically, I admit to a momentary sense of déjà vu before realizing
the first paragraph of chapter two is a verbatim facsimile of the preceding
paragraph. In word choice, spelling, and other conventions, the book
exemplifies the old saying that the United Kingdom and the United
States are two nations divided by a common language. Yet the application
of so many theoretical traditions and their associated technical terms
(e.g., “Potential Absorptive Capacity ‘PACAP’,” “Realized Absorptive
Capacity ‘RACAP’,” “‘single-loop’ and ‘double-loop’ learning,” etc.)
present a steep learning curve to anyone (2, 12). American political
scientists might also quibble about the research design, including the
reliance on qualitative methods and interview sources, or using only two
case studies to advance such an exhaustive new model. But Dyson’s clear
command of the material, the richness of the information conveyed
from interviews, and the uncommonly helpful and explicit practical
implications of the analysis outweigh these concerns.
Dyson’s book contributes to a renaissance in transatlantic scholarly
interest in military learning, often motivated by and focused on the
American and European experience in Afghanistan. It follows works
“such as “Learning the Hard Way” (2016) by Jörg Noll and Sebastiaan
Rietjens and NATO’s Lessons in Crisis (2018) by Heidi Hardt. Hardt and
Dyson pair together exceptionally well. While both authors undertake
a qualitative case study analysis of NATO in Afghanistan, Hardt
emphasizes the international rather than national structures, the strategic
rather than tactical and operational, and the informal methods of learning
rather than formal “LL” (3). Together the books set up a great debate on
the future of this subject—or perhaps the beginning of a new synthesis.
Either way, Dyson makes an important addition to contemporary
conflict viewed from an allied but non-US perspective, comprehensive
thinking about military learning, and practical considerations for army
institutional leadership and civil-military relations. I highly recommend
Organisational Learning and the Modern Army.
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Military History
Phoenix Rising: From the Ashes of Desert One
to the Rebirth of U.S. Special Operations
By Col Keith M. Nightingale (Ret)
Reviewed by David Fivecoat, leadership consultant and retired US Army colonel

O

peration Eagle Claw, the US military operation to rescue the 52
American hostages being held at the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran,
ended in failure at Desert One on the night of April 24–25, 1980, when
a RH-53D helicopter collided with an EC-130 tanker during refueling
operations. In 1979, Keith Nightingale—then a major working on
the Department of the Army staff in the Pentagon—was assigned to
the Joint Task Force Headquarters for the operation. Phoenix Rising is
Nightingale’s fast paced, extremely well-written account of his perspective
on the operation and the subsequent creation of US Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM).
Nightingale’s detailed perspective on the planning, rehearsals, and
execution of the raid are the strongest aspect of the book. Early on he
lays out the challenges of Operation Eagle Claw:
• “Fly 15,000 miles around the world, the last 850 miles in hostile
airspace, and arrive undetected.
• Enter a sprawling metropolitan city of 2,000,000.
• Close with and breach the walls of a heavily guarded, 27-acre
compound.
• Free, without injury, 60+ American citizens from their guards without
injuring any civilians” (15).
Additional conditions included planning, rehearsing, and
executing the operation in complete secrecy within 10 days of
notification; no funding for the operation; and extraction of the
assault force and hostages. These parameters made the hostage rescue
plan extremely complex. With no standing organization trained for the
mission, the Army created an ad hoc Joint Task Force with a headquarters
of 32 people on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon under the command of
Major General James Vaught. The task force included a Delta Force
element, a US Army Rangers element, US Navy RH-53D helicopters,
US Marine Corps helicopter pilots, US Air Force EC-130 and MC-130s
to transport the assault force, US Navy fighter aircraft operating from
the USS Nimitz and USS Coral Sea, as well as US Air Force AC-130
gunships for air support and US Air Force C-141s to extract the force.
The entire Eagle Claw team worked tirelessly to provide a viable
military option to then US President Jimmy Carter. Although the lowestranking person in the Joint Task Force Headquarters, Nightingale
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successfully captures the personalities and series of decisions that
increased the complexity and ad hoc nature of the operation. Vaught
and the team overcame obstacle after obstacle to plan, rehearse, and
execute the operation—especially maintaining secrecy and operating
without a budget.
Although Nightingale concludes the mission failed for mechanical,
organizational, and political reasons, he highlights the US Navy’s failure
to fly the eight RH-53Ds on flight profiles that would have replicated
the distances of the raid—despite being ordered three times to do so.
He also asserts that flying the rehearsal flights, as directed, would have
stressed the aircraft and might have prevented the mechanical loss of
three helicopters prior to Desert One. This omission by the Navy was
not brought up in the post-operation inquiry.
The second-best element of Phoenix Rising is Nightingale’s
perspective on working in the Pentagon. The 1979–81 Pentagon was
very similar to my experience working in the basement of the Pentagon
from 2012–14. I agree with Nightingale’s assessment that for the
military “significant change must come from outside the bureaucracy.
Bureaucracies are very good at fighting that which they don’t want
to do” (208). The stories of resistance from the services, briefings in
the tank, bad meals in the food court, and daily crises will resonate
with readers assigned to the Pentagon, especially those working in the
Joint Staff.
Nightingale provides a unique perspective on the creation of
USSOCOM. From the book, I learned more about programs still used
today (Honey Badger, ELT, Yellow Fruit, and DARISSA) that helped
develop special operations capabilities in the 1980s. Nightingale also
provides a detailed play-by-play of the bureaucratic and political fight
behind the creation of the four-star headquarters that would oversee all
Special Operations Forces and have a line item in the budget to fund the
organization. It is clear, without the failure at Desert One, USSOCOM
would not exist.
While reading the book, I wished Nightingale had used his unique
viewpoint and friendship with the key players to write the definitive
history of Operation Eagle Claw. Charlie Beckwith, Eric Haney, James
Kyle, Mark Bowden, and now Keith Nightingale have all tackled the raid
from different perspectives. It has been more than 40 years since the
operation and not one published book covers all facets of the mission.
Maybe Sean Naylor, Seth Jones, or Eric Schmitt will take on this task.
In short, Phoenix Rising is superb. The book was a pleasure to read
and added another piece to the Operation Eagle Claw puzzle. It should
be read by personnel at all levels in the special operations community
who will draw lessons on planning complex operations, grasp the
challenges of creating ad hoc organizations under pressure, and develop
a deeper understanding of USSOCOM history. It is also a valuable read
for anyone assigned to the Pentagon who will walk away with a better
comprehension of how the bureaucracy works.
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Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War
By Lindsey A. O’Rourke
Reviewed by Dr. Richard H. Immerman, Emeritus Marvin Wachman Director,
Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, Temple University

A

book title that strings together the words covert and regime
change is certain to attract potential readers from the academic,
public, and policy-making communities. Add the subtitle “America’s
Secret Cold War,” impressive research, and methodological rigor, and
the book will be eagerly sought after by top-tier press acquisition editors
and top-tier journal book review editors and provide a gateway to a
tenure track position. Lindsay O’Rourke’s revised dissertation is evidence
of that.
It is surprising, then, that O’Rourke’s contribution to the history of
US foreign relations, intelligence history, and international relations
theory is not just valuable but also original. After all, especially since
the failed Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, US-orchestrated covert actions
aimed at influencing, destabilizing, or overthrowing foreign governments
often made headlines. Even before that, clandestine operations in
Albania, Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Congo, and elsewhere were hardly
well-kept secrets. O’Rourke’s dataset identifies more than 60 covert
efforts to bring about regime change, some 10 times the number of overt
efforts, pursued by the United States between 1947 and 1989. Scholars
and journalists have been aware of each of these efforts. Yet because of
the continued classification of documents and attendant impediments
to research, few authors have sought to chronicle and analyze them
as comprehensively and systematically as O’Rourke, and no one has
succeeded as she has. We owe her a great debt.
Yet O’Rourke’s goal in Covert Regime Change is not so much
to uncover what but to explain why and assess the results and
consequences. Bolstering the salience of the questions she explores is
the continued appeal of covert regime changes after the end of the Cold
War when, at least until 2001, the United States appeared to have less
reason to fear global antagonists. O’Rourke explains this phenomenon
by formulating a typology to categorize the drivers of US policymakers’
decisions to seek regime changes. She begins with offensive operations,
conventionally associated with rollback or liberation, designed to
overthrow a perceived security threat and/or its allies. These operations,
most which targeted Eastern Europe or Soviet nationalities during the
Cold War, were the least effective. The second category is preventive
operations, which aimed to stop a state from developing a weapon or
weapons system or deter it from joining a hostile alliance. Iran and other
Middle Eastern states are exemplars.
Finally, O’Rourke identifies hegemonic operations as those
intended to establish or maintain US dominance. Caribbean and Latin
American nations such as Guatemala, Brazil, or Chile fit this template.
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All told, O’Rourke classifies 23 covert operations in the first category
as covert, 25 in the second category, and 18 in the third category. The
sum of the overt operations that spanned the categories is six, half of
which were hegemonic. She also formulates typologies for the covert
actions themselves.
As a historian I am uncomfortable with typologies. Our discipline
stresses contingency, dissimilarity, and change. In my judgment,
the distinctions O’Rourke draws among the missions are somewhat
artificial, and the boundaries that separate them are porous. One can
identify the 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état—code name Operation
PBSuccess—as offensive or preventive as easily as hegemonic.
Nevertheless, because the United States sought to effect so many regime
changes during the Cold War—revealingly the term regime change did
not become popular until the post–Cold War era when applied publicly
to such states as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria—there is value to
establishing patterns and commonalities. Chief among these, O’Rourke
argues persuasively, is the perception that regime change will advance
US interests more fundamentally than any alternative (negotiations, for
example), that the problem the United States confronts is intractable,
and, perhaps most problematically, that the United States can replace
the offending regime with one more sympathetic to American aims if
not necessarily its values.
Another pattern O’Rourke detects, and perhaps the one on which
the others hinge, is that although covert operations are more likely to fail
than overt ones, policymakers find them all but irresistible because they
appraise the potential risks and costs as lower than overt operations.
They presume a failure will remain hidden or at least the United States
will be able plausibly to deny its culpability. Further, the operation is
unlikely to provoke a great power response. Hence, regardless of the
dismal success rate, covert operations have continued and will almost
surely continue to be high on the menu of policymakers’ options and
instruments. The processes administrations across the board use to
decide on an operation, moreover, are unlikely to serve as a deterrent.
O’Rourke thus joins the chorus of critics who argue that covert
actions are ineffective instruments of US foreign policy and national
security. Even when the operations succeeded in the short run, she
writes, the “covert regime changes seldom worked out as intended,”
and the costs to America’s reputation, image, global relations, and more
far exceeded the rewards (83). But she goes a step beyond by estimating
that notwithstanding the validity of this assessment, policy makers will
be unable to resist the temptation to approve them. This contribution
to the literature is more constructive than her typology, her articulation
of a theory that explains covert regime changes in terms of realism and
security, or even her exhaustive catalog of operations.
Without minimizing the historiographical value of Covert Regime
Change—O’Rourke does intervene in some debates, perhaps most
notably by arguing that John F. Kennedy was “intimately involved” in
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the decision to support a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem—O’Rourke’s
objective is primarily theoretical (179). That will affect readers’ reception
of, if not the book, several of its chapters. All will applaud her research,
however, especially her archival research. In this regard, even though she
fails occasionally to acknowledge adequately that some of her secondary
sources are more reliable and authoritative than others, she has carefully
reconstructed the history of the numerous case studies she presents.
The takeaways from this book will differ among political scientists,
historians, and practitioners, and some will lament the absence of a
bibliography. They all should read it nevertheless.

Civilizing Torture: An American Tradition
By W. Fitzhugh Brundage
Reviewed by Dr. Larry D. Miller, professor of communicative arts, US Army
War College

A

uthor W. Fitzhugh Brundage, the William B. Umstead
Distinguished Professor of History at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, has crafted a perceptive and rather unsettling
contribution to the understanding of torture. Civilizing Torture: An
American Tradition presents eight wide-ranging and articulate chapters
that constitute an admittedly fractured yet remarkably informative history
of torture.
Brundage’s contribution is necessarily imperfect: torturers prefer to
work in the shadows, seldom maintain detailed records, and portray
their activities as favorably as possible when challenged or called to
account. Victims are often reluctant to speak, and an unknown number
of victims never have the opportunity to speak. In addition, what
qualifies as torture in an expansive historical context is as malleable as
it is disturbing. As Brundage aptly observes, “There is no unambiguous
threshold that separates cruelty from torture” (5). Nevertheless, some
constants apply. Invariably inflicted by the powerful on the powerless,
torture involves physical, mental, and often life-threatening pain.
The basic theme throughout this volume is the torture record
demonstrates that American exceptionalism is, and has always been, far
more aspirational than real. By and large Americans have historically
accepted and tacitly embraced brutality and torture while steadfastly
posturing under a presumption of innocence. Torture, Americans believe
and believe with little doubt, is something others do, not the United
States. Alas, Brundage demonstrates the conflict between belief and
action: despite lofty values and assurances to the contrary, Americans
have historically employed torture as a viable means to an end, so much
so that torture, as he argues convincingly, is something of an ongoing
American tradition.
Brundage challenges readers to discern whether a fair, just, and
democratic society can legitimately engage in torture while proudly
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clinging to the foundational values, principles, and perspectives of a
liberal democratic republic that rejects torture as unacceptable and
uncivilized. By documenting the use of torture across multiple historic
contexts and issues, and detailing the ways in which torture has been
enacted, Brundage directs attention to the sustained and compelling
conflict between means and ends—an exceptionally important
contribution, though one that leaves the text disjointed at times.
The Brundage torture tour moves in a hopscotch fashion beginning
in the early 1500s in America, England, and Europe and eventually
landing in the modern era. In each extended and well-developed
instance, Brundage demonstrates the powerful have authority to act,
although torture itself is often, but not always, hidden from view. He
begins by documenting a wealth of torturous acts and brutality well
understood, respected, and practiced by warring tribal groups and
adopted in part by European colonists intent on securing land and
establishing a new republic.
Brundage shows that, over time, torture came to be gently
civilized in the public mind. Torture for the most part was relegated
to and associated with savagery, unregulated frontier conduct, fading
recollections of monarchial tyranny, and often simply ignored or
dismissed as a distressing aberration from the societal norm. Thus,
because torture is antithetical to civility in a liberal democratic republic, the
developing state opted for humane approaches for formal rehabilitation
of individuals whose conduct warranted incarceration and punishment.
Throughout the book, Brundage presents exemplars to demonstrate
the resulting divide between the imagined civil state and the enacted
brutal state characteristic of prison life, police conduct, and military
engagements—all of which are regrettably relevant to contemporary
audiences. Prison life in nineteenth-century America, for example, was
rife with cruelties sanctioned by the state and routinely administered
by institutional authority. Indeed, the shower-bath—a forerunner
of waterboarding—and hooding were common practices in some
northern penitentiaries in the 1800s. The emergence of the modern
police force gave rise to “the third degree,” forced confessions, and
an array of often brutal extralegal practices. The book also examines
torture during the Cold War, the Vietnam experience, the post 9/11
War on Terror, events at Abu Ghraib, and efforts by senior government
officials to authorize “enhanced interrogation” as a legal and acceptable
technique for securing information from suspected terrorists and
unwilling informants (309).
With the publication of Civilizing Torture: An American Tradition,
Brundage effectively augments the literature on torture in the American
experience and its relationship to justice, human rights, dignity, and
democracy. Military strategists, policymakers, and historians will benefit
from his insights, as will readers interested in the strained relationship
between civility and security. Brundage’s unique contribution is to
place, for today’s readers, the reality of torture as a practice conducted
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simultaneously in support of and in direct opposition to American lives
and values. He reminds us the extreme polarization so often identified as
unique to this historical moment is, in fact, rooted in our founding and
made visible through the structures and abuses of power represented at
home and abroad by the specter of American torture.

